Why did the Japanese Army No. 1 cause the 400 thousand countries to collapse completely? The reason is here

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Why did the Japanese Army No. 1 cause the 400 thousand countries to collapse completely? The reason is here

2017-10-13 11:42:48 270 ℃

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This article is connected with the following: "the biggest battle since the invasion of China: Why did the Japanese army risk defeat?"About seven hundred thousand troops were put in

The number of personnel, the Japanese also mobilized a large number of weapons to combat, technology areas, through the advantages of equipment to collapse after six years of war, the army - Chinese is beset with troubles internally and externally due to the lack of its own industry, and the Burma Road has not re opened, Chinese Army Limited supplies through the hump of an utterly inadequate measure. These limited supplies were mostly left to Yunnan to prepare for the Burmese expeditionary forces, so early in 1944, North China, central China, Southern China area, the level of equipment of the Chinese army and the Japanese army is a big gap. The fighting the Japanese army was mobilized to transport vehicles thirteen thousand, sixty-seven thousand horses, the Army Air Corps in Chinese oil reserves, enough for half a year (with the actual due to war continued for a year, and the Sino US Joint Air Force fighting, the Japanese air force late in the campaign to fully support battlefield air supremacy), the infantry unit ammunition reserves up to two years. Taking into account the army will use China Jianbiqingye tactics, the Japanese army deployed a large boat and road and bridge repair engineering unit, to ensure the smooth road before and after the party. In the 1st combat plan, the cable and radio stations up to the headquarters, and the repairs to the army boots, are all inclusive and methodical, and the degree of perfection is breathtaking. According to statistics, the mobilization scale of Japanese army was more than two times of that of Japanese Army during the Russo Japanese war. In particular, due to the importance of this battle, the Japanese are still Chinese battlefield for the first time to use the armor - tank division third division system in this battle. This is the Japanese Army during World War II only once to the division level and armored troops into combat attack. This division has four tank army two brigade regiment, a mechanised infantry regiment, three regiment other troops, fighting strong, large-scale armored forces established Japanese reference results after the Blitz in europe. It is undoubtedly a new subject for the Chinese army to fight with such Japanese troops.

Japanese vehicles

With sufficient strength and sophisticated equipment, it does not mean that it can be used properly. The Japanese army made great efforts in selecting the commander of the 1st combat command. Finally, familiar with Chinese battlefield general Okamura Neji was appointed the Sixth Army commander, he commanded the Japanese north south to rendezvous with the Japanese Central China, to complete the task through the pinghan line, which is a strategic goal of the first stage of the campaign. Subsequently, the Japanese troops in Southern China is in the north of the twenty-third Corps under the command of Tanaka Kuchi attack, the Japanese Central China through the Han line coordinate. Thus, the two branches though Vicenza, but the Japanese central action is the key to complete a number of combat. Because Okamura Neji had been concentrating on the Eight Route Army of North China, he had been away from South China for a while, and was unfamiliar with the operation in this area. Therefore, the Japanese army still needs to choose a similar to the football team midfielder soul character generals to control the battle in this area. Finally, a general who had just suffered a bit the previous year was chosen by the base camp. This is the commander of the Japanese army in Central China, Lieutenant General of the eleventh army commander Yokoyama Yong.

Yokoyama Yong was born in Chiba County, northeast of Japan, and was born in a military family. Graduated from the Japanese army NCO school twenty-first in May 27, 1909 with excellent results. Due to outstanding performance in the school during the same period of Ishihara Kanji, the village of rice stalk and known as the "twenty-first of the three bird". Yokoyama Yong has been a long time in the Northeast China as the Kwantung Army commander was transferred to South China, December 22, 1942. This is because the Japanese commander of the eleventh army commander Tian Tian Jie was killed in the Dabie Mountains of Anhui Province, and the base camp transferred him to take over. At this point, he had been in the eleventh army for more than a year.

Although the name has a "Yong" word, but Yokoyama Yong's appearance is more like a civil service. He presided over the battle of Changde in 1943, but the outcome was not substantial. The China army seventy-fourth army fifty-seven division strong resistance, a few road around the Japanese battle in Changde more than a month, finally only occupied the city one day is forced to evacuate, did not reach the strategic goal of seizing Hunan, Chinese grain producing areas and suffer heavy casualties, suffered heavy casualties. In this case, why the Japanese army still use Yokoyama Yong as commander in chief of this campaign? This is mainly because Yokoyama Yong is considered one of the more familiar with the Japanese senior generals of Chinese military tactics, he has long served in the Kwantung Army, is to participate in a number of temporary deployment of the Kwantung Army combat troops to its more respect. At the same time, Hengshan is also a famous Japanese "wise will", good at learning from the war. In fact, Yokoyama Yong in a battle is not negative "will" in the name of him in the formulation of operational plan fully studied China general Xue Yue in Changsha tested "Tianlu war" tactics, and put forward a targeted release Avenue, wings effect strategy, really curb "furnace war strength, make Chinese military guard for years Changsha positions were forced to give up.

Use number 92 in combat 1Japanese heavy machine guns

However, in actual combat, Chinese troops to fight the tenacious beyond the Japanese surprise, because China Hengyang garrison tenth army fought against the Japanese offensive, two can not get the pass, therefore also had the idea of change horses in midstream. That was another midfielder Sakanishi Ira sent to the front line, ready to succeed Yokoyama Yong.

In addition to the above, the Japanese also widely in the pre war take deception measures troops to attack after starting the movement is very subtle, for example, to participate in the meeting before the highest lien combat infantry commander of the Japanese third division did not know tanks going to war. At the same time, a large number of carefully trained Japanese plainclothes troops before the fighting began will penetrate into the Chinese army rear reconnaissance harassment, so the Japanese at the beginning of the battle reached the battlefield interdiction objective.

Staying behind ninthwarareacountryarmy

The face of the Japanese China but because of wildly beating gongs and drums, reconnaissance intelligence lag and endless infighting and neglect the forthcoming attack information - Jiang Jieshi and Stillwell for the leadership of the China theater fighting. Therefore, when the Japanese army launched "No. 1 combat" in February 1944, it immediately brought great pressure to the Chinese army at the front line.

Editor: Yu Lin

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