This man is known as a general. He has no basic military knowledge and is disgraced.

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This man is known as a general. He has no basic military knowledge and is disgraced.

2019-01-13 09:03:26 370 ℃
< p > On June 21, 1931, Chiang Kai-shek personally took German, Japanese and British military advisers to Nanchang and assumed the post of Commander-in-Chief of the "encirclement and suppression" Army. He Yingqin was the former enemy's commander-in-chief. He mobilized 23 divisions and three brigades, with about 300,000 troops, to prepare for the third "encirclement and suppression". On June 30, Wang Zheng, the captain of the Red Army Radio Communications Team, intercepted a telegram sent by Chiang Kai-shek to He Yingqin and learned that the enemy had begun its third campaign against the Central Soviet Area. On July 1, Chiang Kai-shek launched an all-round attack. At that time, the Red Army, which ended the second counter-encirclement and suppression campaign, was far away in Western Fujian. Zhu Mao decided to continue to adopt the strategic policy of luring the enemy in depth, and to use the good mass and topographic conditions in the hinterland of the Soviet area to concentrate the superior forces on standby to break through the enemy. On July 10, the Red Army returned to its base area in Jiangxi by a roundabout route from Qianli in Western Fujian. Under the leadership of Chen Cheng, the 11th and 14th divisions of Chiang Kai-shek's elite encirclement and suppression forces followed the main forces of the Red Army and occupied Kangdu and Guangchang successively, and Ningdu, the central Soviet area, on 19 July.

(the main plan of the third anti-encirclement and suppression campaign)

On July 22, the main forces of the Red Army arrived near the Yinkeng in southwestern Ningdu and assembled. Here, Zhu Mao is determined to take the opportunity of Chen Chengbu's long-distance Trek and exhausted troops to kill him with a rifle. On the 24th, Zhu Mao issued the Order to Eliminate the Enemy Attacked by Lai Village. He decided to fight an ambush battle in Lai Village on the halfway from Ningdu to Yinkeng in which Chen Chengbu pursued the Red Army on the one hand. The order was issued and the troops moved. But Chen Cheng had no idea that the main force of the Red Army was in Yindu, so instead of pursuing the southwest, he turned his head and went northwest. On the one hand, the main force of Zhu Mao's army continued to March westward, and arrived at Xingguo.

arrived at Xingguo. On the one hand, the Red Army headquarters formally studied the methods of the third counter-encirclement and suppression campaign. Chairman Mao is still the "old pattern" of the previous two times: concentrating on the main force, starting from the westernmost front of the enemy's encirclement and suppression campaign, first of all, searching for the enemy of the annihilation movement in Futian area, breaking through the enemy a little, and sweeping eastward with victory. Now let's review the first and second counter-encirclement and suppression campaigns. In the first counter-encirclement campaign, the Red Army laid an ambush in Longgang near Futian, surrounded and annihilated Division Zhang Huizhan, then defeated Division Tan Daoyuan in Dongshao to the east; in the second counter-encirclement campaign,

the Red Army laid an ambush in the east near Futian, surrounded and annihilated the impartial Fan Division, and swept eastward all the way. < p > < p > Bingjiayun: The forces are changeable and the water is changeable.

But why is Chairman Mao's third counter-encirclement and suppression still the same route, starting from Fukuda and sweeping eastward? There are three reasons for Chairman Mao's determination:

First, in the direction of Futian, enemy Chiang Kai-shek and Cai Bu are in charge of the fifty-second, sixty-first and sixty-first divisions. Chief Commander Jiang Guangnao (Commander-in-Chief of the 19th Route Army) was convalescing in Shanghai at that time. Cai Tingkai, the head of the 60th Division, was acting as general commander. The department was very Kaishen and had a weak fighting capacity. It belongs to "weakening the enemy first".

Secondly, the local Party committee reported that there were not many enemy troops entering Futian, only about three regiments, and the Red Army could form an absolute military advantage.

< p> Third, Chen Cheng, the elite main force of Jiang Jun's lineage, and the 11th and 14th divisions of Luo Zhuoying's headquarters are still in the Ningdu area of southern Jiangxi. When the Red Army launched its campaign in Futian, western Jiangxi, it would put the enemy's elite main force in vain. The Strategic Questions of China's Revolutionary War states: "(Third Anti-encirclement and Suppression) The first policy we have decided is to break through Futian by Xingguo through Wan'an, and then sweep across the line of contact behind the enemy from west to east, so that the main forces of the enemy will penetrate into the base areas of southern Jiangxi and put them in a useless position, which will be the first stage of combat. When the enemy turns back to the north, he will be very tired, and he will hit his opponent in the air. In fact, the main force of the enemy's elite was no longer in southern Jiangxi. As mentioned earlier, Chen Cheng and Luo Zhuoying did not chase the Red Army in the southwest, but went north because they did not know the main position of the Red Army. It seems that the Red Army did not know this at that time.

Therefore, Zhu Mao decided to attack the enemy of Futian on his own initiative and issued the Order of Capturing Futian Xin'an on July 31, 1931:

< p> (1) According to the 12th Army report, Donggu invaded the enemy of Baishi and this day entered Chongxian. According to the report of the Purification Zone Committee, the enemies in Futian, Beitou and Xin'an had three regiments. Whether Donggu Chiang Kai-shek and Cai Bu were all directed towards Chongxian and Longgang is unclear.

< p> (2) The front troops made a detour around the enemy's back and smashed the rear road, causing the enemy to shake and shake, and then destroyed the attempts of their large forces, so as to seize Futian and Xin'an first.

< p> (3) On July 31 (today), all the units of the First Legion must be moved by night to the following places: the Fourth Army to Shibizheng, the Twelfth Army to Xiaoyaoling, the headquarters to Tien Ting, and the Third Army to Lao Ying Pan. The 35th Army is in Xingguo City, and the 3rd Army and 7th Army go to Chayuan Gang and Shacun (about 30 miles) to rest.

(4) On the night of August 1, the Fourth Army marched into Guping Dike (between Daijiafang and Shibi Dike, a red area), the Twelfth Army and its headquarters into Shibi Dike, the Third Army into Xiaoyaoling and Shibi Dike, and the Third Army and the Seventh Army into Wanxi, Guanxi, Tongshan, Dongyi, Gaoling and Ma Tian.

< p> (5) On the night of August 2, the first, third and second Corps departed from their original positions, one Corps attacked Futian, and the third and seventh Corps attacked Xin'anwei, all of which had to start attacking at 2 p.m. (i.e. in the morning of the third).

(6) The daily marching time of each army is from 6:30 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. and from 5:10 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. for rest and sleep. Must not disobey orders and cause any delay.

(7) When attacking Futian and Xin'an, the headquarters of the three armed forces was in the lead.

Please note that there is no information about the main enemy forces Chen Cheng and Luo Zhuoying in the order. The order

< p> requires the troops to advance in concealment at night on 31 July and 1 August (with special emphasis on night marches and day breaks) and to attack on the night of 2 August. The battle of

would definitely be fought in a Tucheng battle if it were to be fought at night on August 2. (The Tucheng battle was the first battle fought by the Red Army after the Zunyi Conference.) Because the information before the war was not accurate, it was thought that only four regiments of Sichuan Army were found in Tucheng, and only six regiments were found in the fighting, and two subsequent brigade reinforcements were coming. As a result, the Red Army was forced to withdraw from the fighting and was almost surrounded by the Sichuan Army.

Because by this time, the enemy had found that the main force of the Red Army was enjoying the prosperity of the country and had signs of moving towards Futian. It is inevitable that the enemy will find out that

is moving in the same direction again and again.

He Yingqin immediately reported to Chiang Kai-shek while ordering Chen Cheng and Luo Zhuoying, who had gone north to Donggu, to Futian. On August 2, Chen Cheng and Luo Zhuoying, the two main elite divisions, rushed into Futian, but the Red Army had not yet found out. He Yingqin seized this good opportunity and, in the name of Jiang, issued an order to "eliminate the Communist bandits within ten days". At this time, Chiang Kai-shek's forces in Futian had surpassed those of the Red Army. If this battle starts, the Red Army will not be able to chew on these two hard walnuts, and the enemy forces in other directions will soon be encircled. On the night of August 2, a fierce battle for the main forces of the Red Army is about to start. However, the battle, which was very unfavorable to the Red Army, did not succeed.

because the Red Army Radio Communications Team intercepted the telegram. In the second counter-encirclement and suppression campaign, the Red Army seized a set of "100-watt" radio stations from the 28th Division of Fair and Fair Van. in Donggu. At that time, on the one hand, Zhu Mao's army headquarters beat eastward all the way to Jianning, Fujian Province, while Xiang Ying and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area stayed in the Southern Jiangxi Soviet Area. The Central Bureau of the Soviet Area used "100 watts", while the Red Army headquarters used Tan Daoyuan's 15 watts. Radio communication began between two o'clock. During the second counter-encirclement and suppression campaign, the Red Army also seized many radio stations in the battle of Guangchang. On the one hand, the Red Army set up a radio communication corps, which equipped the legions and armies with radio stations.

In the third counter-encirclement and suppression campaign, Cao Danhui was ordered to bring a radio station with the Red Army. On August 2, 1931, at 16:00 p.m., Cao Dan-hui intercepted the urgent telegram sent by He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek's armies on the radio: "Fight the bandits within 10 days". The code used in the telegram was "dense" used by Ho Yingqin in the second counter-encirclement campaign. In the second counter-encirclement and suppression campaign, the Red Army, together with a "100-watt" radio station, seized a "strong" one in annihilating the 28th Division of Justice and Justice. So the Red Army has a complete grasp of Ho Yingqin's password.

It's lamentable that He Yingqin is known as a famous general. He doesn't even have basic military knowledge. He doesn't know how to keep secret and fight any battles. (He Yingqin in the 1930s)

So Cao Danhui translated the telegram with "dense". The full text of the telegram totals 324 words, which fully exposes Chiang's campaign attempt of "dividing in and jointly attacking" and the deployment and offensive routes of various units. < p > < p > Cao Danhui rushed to report to Huang Gongliao and Cai Hui's Civil and Political Committee. They read it and immediately transferred it to Zhumao.

Zhu Mao immediately ordered the troops to withdraw to Xingguo Happy Pool. At this time, the enemy forces of all ministries advanced further. On the one hand, the Red Army had only a very small area near Happy Pool, which was extremely unfavorable to the Red Army. However, because of the clear understanding of the enemy's situation and the deployment of the enemy forces, the victory in counter-encirclement and suppression will be more assured. Returning to Happy Pool, Zhu Mao immediately chose the next target according to the content of He Yingqin's telegram. On August 3, Zhu Mao issued the Order to Eliminate the Enemy from Chongxian to Happy Foundation, and decided to attack Cai Tingqian from Chongxian to Happy Foundation in the Northwest first. But Cai Tingkai was afraid to move forward. But Cai Tingkai's left neighbour, Shangguan Yunxiangbu, came out. A brigade of Cai Tingkai came out of Liangcun and wanted to go through Liantang to rejuvenate the Red Army on the one hand.

Zhu Mao immediately decided to fight the enemy first. On the evening of August 4, the Red Army, on the one hand, passed through the 40-mile gap between Chiang Ding-wen Division (Jiangbei Ruins) and Cai Tingkai Division (Chongxian), and quickly went out to Liantang area. On the evening of August 6, the Red Army, the Fourth and Seventh Armies joined the enemy secretly and attacked suddenly at dawn on the seventh day. At 9 o'clock, another battalion of the 2nd Brigade of the 47th Division was annihilated. Later, the main force of the Red Army marched to Liangcun by victory. On the way, it encountered the 160th Brigade of the 54th Division assisted by Liangcun and annihilated one of its regiments. The rest of the brigade fled to Liangcun. The Red Army pursued its ranks and attacked Liangcun at about 13 o'clock, wiping out the 54th division headquarters and most of the 2nd brigade that had just been withdrawn from Liangcun by Chenggang.

Liangcun battle, on the one hand, the Red Army attacked Longgang with the Red Army's feint, the main force marched eastward, encircling the 8th Division of the enemy's 3rd legion, which had just retreated from Junbu and Nanling. At noon on the 11th, he launched an attack on Huangpi, bursting into the village and annihilating the 2nd regiment of the 8th Division. At 1500 hours, the rest of the 8th Division broke through to Luokou and Ningdu, and the Red Army annihilated two more regiments in its pursuit.

Liantang annihilated the 47 th Division Tan Zijun Brigade, Liangcun annihilated the majority of the 54th Division of Yunxiang, Shangguan, and Huang Pei annihilated about four regiments of the 8th Division Mao Bingwen, making the Red Army three quick fixes in four days.