The US think tank proposes the "active refusal" strategy to curb China

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The US think tank proposes the "active refusal" strategy to curb China

2022-06-24 00:33:09 4 ℃

[Text/Observer.com Wang Shichun] "How to curb China under the circumstances of finance?"

The U.S. think tank "Institute of the National Policy Research Institute" in the US think tank published a research article on June 20. Although the article is unreasonable to accuse China of "expanding risks", the article acknowledge that China's rise is "gradually changing regional strength comparison." In this regard, the article proposes that in the limited financial situation, the US military should give up the offensive control strategy, because this will prevent the cooperation of the entire region and lead to military competitions and the risk of hot war. The U.S. military should use the "active refusal" strategy to curb China.

Specific measures to "actively refuse", the think tank believes that the U.S. military should abandon the "active attack", but "defensive counterattack", combat the troops distributed, strengthen the military political connection with the allies, and weaken the PLA so -called through a series of military reforms. The first wave of "offensive".

In terms of troops reform, the U.S. Navy and the Air Force should further reform the structure of the army, retire the old fighter ships, replace large aircraft carriers with light aircraft carriers, and increase the proportion of unmanned equipment. The Army and the Marine Corps should reduce troops and equip more motorized anti -ship missiles and unmanned equipment. The purpose of this reform is to prevent rifles.

In addition to the requests on the reform of the U.S. military, think tanks also hope that the so -called "American allies" such as the Taiwan military, Japan and South Korea, etc. will also reform their military structure. In order to obtain a "retaliatory" long -range strike weapon, the allies have caused arms competitions and nuclear upgrades.

In the direction of specific reforms, the think tank hopes that the Taiwan army will "completely abandon the navy and air force" and reorganize the troops into a "army" composed of motorized anti -tank missiles, mobile air defense missiles and a large number of people. The "sponge" of firepower is delayed consuming the PLA.

Report cover

Take the initiative to refuse

The U.S. Think Tank's "Institute of Policy of the Quinxi" was established in 2019 and is located in Washington Special Administrative Region. It is named after the name of former US President John Quinky Adams, and it is a think tank composed of "realist" diplomats. The think tank advocates US foreign policy as much as possible. Excessive concession.

The think tank stated at the beginning that with the deterioration of Sino -US relations, the possibility of military conflicts in China and the United States greatly increased. A variety of factors including Taiwan may lead to a serious upgrade of Asian conflicts. This upgrade is not desirable because it will pose a threat to the security and prosperity of the United States.

In order to avoid this situation, three members of the East Asian project of the Qinxi Institute and researchers from other departments conducted this one -year research. Lead, this is a major task for the United States to formulate a safer military strategy in Asia. The 10 authors of this report have rich professional knowledge and experience on these issues, and have been high -level members in the government, the US military, and the American Central Love Bureau.

In order to demonstrate their views

The strategy is called "active rejection", which lists the necessary military reform to reduce the possibility of upgrading the situation when the conflict occurs, and at the same time ensure that any military attack in China cannot be successful. Compared with the previous Trump administration's national defense plan, the strategy has an additional benefit, that is, to save about $ 75 billion each year by 2035.

With the increase in Chinese military forces in the past 30 years, the military dominance of the United States in the Western Pacific has been significantly weakened. The United States is trying to restore the military dominance of the region through an offensive control strategy, but this effort is unlikely to succeed. These efforts are not only in finances; they may also exacerbate the risks of crisis, conflict, and rapid upgrading of war, thereby producing a counterproductive effect.

In view of these trends, think tanks believe that the United States needs a more credible, more stable, and more affordable defense strategy to curb "possible military operations in China." At the same time, the U.S. military also needs a diplomatic strategy to alleviate military tensions and improve crisis management. In this case, the think tank hopes that the study will achieve the following three purposes:

1. Effectively prevent potential "aggression";

2. Strengthen strategic stability and avoid nuclear upgrade;

3. In the case of fiscal tightening, the U.S. military affords the military expenses of the new era.

At the beginning of the article, the think tank acknowledged that this research report focuses on the military strategy and provides a clear reform plan for the previously vague "active rejection" line to formulate a specific policy route map. This report is only to adjust the US defense strategy in the Asia -Pacific region, and does not pay attention to how to curb China.

The comparison of the major Indo -Pacific countries against China and the European economies of European countries against Russia

Troops reform

The U.S. military should give up their original goals and no longer pursue "conquering China" or pursuing the change of the Chinese regime. Active refusal is a defensive strategy, which is characterized by distributed deployment. The focus of this method is to deploy elasticity and defensive American and allies forces to pass on and destroy attacks, while preparing to concentrate on back later. The "active rejection" depends on the more wise division of labor between the Allies and the US forces deployed. "Active rejection" can also limit the scale of war, and its ultimate goal is to defeat the attack, not to conquer opponents.

These changes to the implementation of US defense strategies, troops structure and troops will significantly enhance deterrence, stability and fiscal sustainability. The core means proposed by the think tank are as follows: 1. By making the armed forces of the United States and its allies more tough, active refusal strategies will ensure that the United States and its allies avoid failure at the beginning of the conflict, and counterattack at the subsequent stage.

2. By making the deployment more defensive and focusing on the attack on the enemy's offensive forces. The new proposal strategy will limit rapid and early nuclear upgrades and reduce the risk of accident nuclear upgrade.

3. By prioritizing the troops that are suitable for the Asian theater, cut the ground forces and adopt a new concept of strike.

In order to achieve such a goal, American allies and partners, including Taiwan, need to do more for military forces, especially the "hedgehog strategy" with high cost benefits, and invest in more anti -ship missiles and air defense systems. As well as reforming military organizations and training, reducing the vulnerability of its military forces.

At the same time, the United States will reorganize its military deployment in the Western Pacific. It will reduce its cutting -edge ground troops and large surface platforms, and increase investment in confrontation weapons and small surface platforms. At the same time, the United States will scattered the frontier deployment to a larger area and a more strategic area, and adopt passive defense and active defense to enhance the resistance, rather than maintaining the troops in the cutting -edge position of the high concentration and being easily attacked by attacks. Essence

The structure of the US military should also be reforming, focusing on the US Navy and the Air Force, reducing the scale of the Army and the Marine Corps, and changing its structure.

Specifically, in the reform of the navy, the United States and Air Force should:

The Navy should develop small aircraft carriers, replacing half of the existing large aircraft carriers with a ratio of 2 to 1. Compared to large ships, it should expand the inventory of small surface ships and maintain the ability of submarine forces and logistics fleet.

The Air Force should reorganize and emphasize the maintenance and ground protection capabilities, accelerate the reduction of old aircraft, and improve the arm force of new fighters. In addition, it should reduce maintenance costs and maintain the capacity of tankers, transportation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps should reduce 26 of the total 71 brigade battle teams and the Marine Corps infantry regiments, including 8 of the active brigade -level troops. In the Asia -Pacific theater, these troops should focus on the ability to prevent air and maritime aggression, including more mobile remote ground -to -air missiles and anti -ship capabilities.

The military situation in Asia should also be adjusted to reflect a positive rejection strategy. The United States and its allies should increase investment in regional infrastructure to improve their resistance and prepare for distributed operations. At the same time, troops within the scope of China's firepower, such as most of the Naval Marine Corps ground troops in Okinawa and some US Air Force assets in South Korea, etc., should be transferred to other places.

The US military's deployment in Indo -Pacific

Ally

In order to reach a "active rejection" strategy, the United States' allies and partners in the region, especially Japan and Australia, must strengthen their defense and bear more responsibilities to balance China's power.

To achieve this, the United States must deepen contact with Asian allies and partners. In order to avoid the simple "American VS China" strategy, the United States needs the support of allies and partners. The U.S. military cannot emphasize military means too much, but ignores the diplomatic, political and economic level of security policies.

However, in order to increase the military investment of the allies, the United States should reduce military investment.

Specific to specific allies, Think Tank believes that the U.S. military should treat allies differently in diplomatic and cooperation.

For example, South Korea, Think Tank believes that the current deadlock of the Korean Peninsula is first of all a diplomatic and political challenge. Therefore, we recommend that the United States adopt diplomatic and political strategies and move towards the establishment of a peace mechanism, including the establishment of Pyongyang's gradual nuclearization mechanism. Such a peaceful system should adhere to the original intention of maintaining the peace of the Korean Peninsula and resisting North Korea.

The United States should understand that although South Korea has greatly increased its vigilance in China and South Korea has also begun to prepare various military preparations on China's threats, South Korea is unwilling to become part of the military alliances of many Asian countries that curb China. The United States should respect this reluctance. This restraint will help curb the security predicament of the United States and China in the region and prevent the possibility of direct military contact on the US -China Peninsula.

For Japan, Japan should increase investment in the Air Force and the Navy and reduce investment in ground forces. In order to promote these efforts, the United States should re -negotiate the "Special Measures Agreement" with Japan to reduce the expectations of "comprehensive military support" in the United States in Tokyo in exchange for Japan to increase national defense budget or increase military infrastructure expenditures.

At the same time, in the case of military reforms in the U.S. military, the United States should also seek to reduce the total number and permanent facilities in the United States, while expanding the use of civil ports and airports for training and emergency.

Hedgehogized Taiwan

For key Taiwan issues, think tanks suggest that the U.S. military should continue to maintain "strategic ambiguity." Strategic vagueness requires the United States to maintain its minimum credible military capabilities to defend Taiwan. Although the U.S. military does not promise to directly defend Taiwan, the establishment of hedgehog strategies that specialize in distributed ground, air defense and anti -ship capabilities, and the defense treaty centered on Japan and the United States will be enough to achieve this.

In order to allow Taiwan to "more effectively defend themselves", the United States must more strictly abide by discipline when selling weapons to Taipei, and takes hedgehog into Taiwan as its core. The United States should give priority to selling anti -ship cruise missiles in Taipei, ground -to -air missiles, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and mines, so that Taipei can implement a defensive hedgehog strategy. The United States should encourage Taipei to shift its domestic industry's focus to this ability and stay away from remotely attack missiles.

Danish anti -ship missile is a good example

Taiwan should also increase investment to ensure sufficient ground forces, cover potential landing areas, including airports, port facilities and beaches, and have reliable weapons and human reserves, which can make up for losses and operate effectively.

The U.S. military should also make it clear to Taiwan that U.S. ground forces will not be able to replace the Taiwan Army and reserve forces, and the role of beaches and port defense, guerrilla warfare and urban warfare in Taiwan.

However, the article also warns that the United States should also be careful not to exacerbate security difficulties with China under the circumstances of strengthening defense cooperation. Expanding the official alliance in Asia may further stimulate China's fear of being surrounded.

Similarly, while promoting the security cooperation and self -defense capabilities of East Asian countries, Washington should avoid seeking to establish a more militarized multinational organization and even the "NATO" organization in the region. This formal defense alliance risk is to further stimulate China The fear of being surrounded, thus accelerating the security difficulties, and its risks will exceed potential deterrent benefits.

On the contrary, even while strengthening its security cooperation in the region, it is crucial that the United States cooperates with allies and partners to create and seek opportunities for security dialogue and ease the relationship between tensions with China.

Think tanks suggest that China and the United States must first maintain contact, establish a more effective crisis management mechanism, reduce the probability of crisis occurred, and prevent crisis from upgrading to war. Essence The United States should acknowledge the mutual fragility with China and negotiate the restriction of anti -commissioned systems to promote the defense treaty with China.

The article finally admits. They need strong political leadership of the President and Minister of Defense. This will be the key to overcoming the deep -rooted bureaucracy, Congress and defense industry. These interests have caused the United States to fall into inertia in the recent budget and procurement. Only through such leaders can the United States implement more effective, more stable and more affordable defense strategies, and conduct a necessary diplomatic connection with allies and partners and China itself. In turn, this method is the key to preventing and reducing the danger of war in the United States and China.